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urge that CA 8 improperly reversed an ~C · 
order of the SEC. This order would have allowed a merger 
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between E. I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co. ("Du Pont") and Christiana 
Securities Co. ("Christiana") by finding it exempt from Sect i on 
17 of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
II. FACTS: Christiana is a holding company whose asset -
portfolio consists mainly (9~/o) of Du Pont stock. This stock - -
held by Christiana accounts for approximately 2~/o of the total 
amount of Du Pont stock outstanding. Christiana is a registered --
investment comEany under the Investment company Act of 1940 • 
._..... -= ' 
Christiana was initially formed as a control device to 
ensure that the Du Pont family continued to control Du Pont. 
At the present time, Christina is traded on the over the counter 
market; however, ownership in Christiana stock is still highly 
concentrated. Those who control Christiana (and control Du Pont 
I 
as well) have concluded that Christiana has outlived its 
usefulness, and wish to have Christiana disgorge jts Du Pont 
stock. Due to the very low income tax basis of the Du Pont 
stock held by Christiana, a taxable transaction would be 
unacceptable due to the very large capital gains tax generated 
thereby. 
Thus it was determined that Christiana should merge tax-
free into Du Pont. The net effect of the transaction would 
would be that Christiana stockholders would surrender their 
Christiana stock, and receive Du Pont common stock in return. 
Essentially, Christiana shareholders would receive pro rata, 
-3-
one share of Du Pont stock for every share of Du Pont stock which 
Christiana now holds •. 1/ 
Although this appears straightforward, a problem arises from 
the fact that Christiana common stock sells over the counter at a -
substantial (approximately 28.5%) discount from the market value 
of the common stock which Christiana owns. In other words, for a 
$100 investment in Christiana common stock an investor could 
acquire a $128.50 indirect ownership of Du Pont stock. This 
h 
0 f 1 d do 0 y p enomenon ~s common or c ose -en ~nvestment compan~es, and 
-----evidentally springs from the corporate ownership of the investment 
stock. For example, Christiana must pay a tax of effectively 7.~/o 
upon any dividend which Du Pont pays. Then if the dividend is 
distributed, the Christiana shareholders also have to pay their 
personal income tax thereon. Therefore, there is an added tax 
I --
1 
burden in that such dividends are subject to double taxation when 
the holding companies pass the dividends through. Furthermore, 
in the instant case, the income tax basis of Christiana's 
1/Actually, Du Pont was to issue shares of its own common stock 
equal in value to 97.5% of the net asset value of all Christiana's 
assets (approximately 9~/o of which consisted of Du Pont common 
stock). Thus, DuPont would receive a 2.5% "discount" on its 
common shares received by it. 
YEssentially, a closed-end mutual fund (or investment company) is 
one whose shares trade at whatever price the market will bear. On 
the otherhand, an open-end mutual is one which trades at net asset 
value per share -- the market value of the fund~ portfolio, less 
liabilities, divided by the number of shares of the fund outstanding. 
An open-end fund buys and sells its shares at net asset value; a 
closed-end company is sold from one investor to another at whatever 
price is agreed upon. 
-4-
portfolio is so low that the potential capital gains liability 
inhering in the Du Pont stock upon sale reduces the value of 
the Du Pont stock. 
Section 17(a) of the 1940 Act proscribes mergers between 
Svhy..vt t-o H\.Q. AcX: 
two affiliated corporationsh However, Section 17(b) allows 
the SEC to issue an order exempting the transaction from ----- -
Section 17(a) upon a finding that: 
11 (1) the terms of the proposed transaction, 
including the consideration to be paid or 
received, are reasonable and fair and do 
not involve overreaching on the part of 
any person concerned. • • • 11 
The SEC made such a finding exempting the transaction. 
------------~------------------
However, certain minority shareholders of Du Pont sought review 
of this order, pursuant to Section 43(a) of the Act. (Sections 
17 & 43 (a) are appended hereto.) 
III. DECISIONS BELOW: The SEC, by unanimous vote, found 
~ the terms of the proposed merger to be fair and reasonable and 
I to invvlve no overreaching. The Commission recognized that the 
merger dealt with an exchange of stock substantially equivalent ~ 
value. However, it also recognized the substantial benefits 
that the merger would confer upon the Christiana stockholders 
in that Christiana stockholders would receive Du Pont stock 
t~l 
based upon the market value of fstock, rather than upon the 
t\ 
market value of Christiana's stock itself. 
-
( -5-
crucial to the SEC's determination of fairness was its 
~
---- - t\v'L finding thatlinvestment company should be valued at the net 
<::_ 
~sset val~e_?~~~tf~lio, rather than at the market prjce 
at which its stock is currently selling. Appendix at 32 A. 
Thus, the SEC viewed the fact that Christiana's shareholders 
were to receive value in excess of that which they could then ~ 
d.&.~ 
currently realize upon the market by sale of their shares as ~~~~ 
a benefit to them without corresponding detriment to Du Pont. 
Thus the substantial inequality between the market value of 
Christiana shares and Du Pont shares, on a pro rata basis, djd 
not lead the SEC to conclude that the merger terms were not 
fair and reasonable. 
Having thus found that Du Pont shareholders did not have 
I 
a right to share in the tax benefits accruing to Christiana's 
shareholders via the merger, and further that the increased 
number of Du Pont shares available for sale after the merger 
would not significantly depress the price of Du Pont stock, 
the SEC concluded that the merger was within the realm of 
fairness. .,. 
With a d~ed panel, ~evers~ The essence of CA 8' s 
disagreement with the SEC was based upon the SEC's valuation of 
Christiana a t_ the net asset value of its portfolio. CA 8 found 
that the SEC erred in deciding as a matter of law that net asset 
value is the proper valuation technique. CA 8, citing income 
( 
0 ,~t) ~ Q.s+-~k 
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ktax cases, felt that the market value of the Chrjstiana's shares 
l-= ..... 
was the relevant value to be used. CA 8 found that the merger 
negotiation was not at arms-length, and that, valuing Christiana 
at its market value, the benefits to Christiana shareholders 
far outweighed those to Du Pont shareholders. CA 8 concluded 
that "there is nof. substantial evidence on the basis of this 
record to support the Commission's finding ••• ". 
In attempting to analyze the case, CA 8 appointed 
Roger Upson, Associate Dean of the University of Minnesota, 
College of Business Administration, to serve as consultant to 
assist the court "in understanding the record in this case 
to prepare reports and memoranda for this court in connection 
with that function." Appendix at 91 A. 
'" Judge Stephenson, dissenting, accorded great weight to the 
findings of the SEC below, and concluded that "'the Commission's 
action is based upon substantial evidence and js consistent with 
the authority granted by Congress.' Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 u.s. 194, 207 (1946) ." 
I 
Petrs' petn for rehearing en bane were denied by an equally 
divided court. 
IV. CONTENTIONS: The SEC and the corporations contend 
that ·CA 8 was wrong in rejecting the SEC's use of net asset 
value, and in finding the merger not fair. They argue that 
CA 8 should have been guided by this Court's pronouncement in 
-7-
Securities and Exchange Commission v • . chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 
194, 209 (1946): 
"Tb C . . ' J • . c ommission s conr uswn here rests ~quare-
]y m t~at area where administrill i ·;e jud,g,!,,11,~nts 
are tl d to the greatest amonnt of wei (Tht 
by appe a e cou1. s. Is JC pro uc o ad-
ministrative experience, apprec: iation of the com-
plexities of the problem, realization of the statu-
tory policies, and responsible treatment of the 
uncontested facts. It is the type of judgment 
which administrative agencies are best equipped 
to make and ''hich justifies the use of the admin-
istrative process. See Republtc Aviation Corp. Y. 
Labor Board, 324 U.S. 793, 800. vVhether we 
agree or disagree with the result reached, it is 
an allowable judgment which \Ve cannot disturb." 
Under this standard, petrs urge, the SEC's findings of fairness 
should not have been disturbed. 
The SEC also argues that CA 8's opinion wjll create substantial 
uncertainty regarding the standards of fairness for Section 17 
transactions; the SEC has heretofore consistently used the net 
The corporate petrs also object to CA 8's going "outside of 
the record" by its employment of Dean Upson as a consultant. 
V. DISCUSSION: The issue of whether the transaction is 
"fair" is a difficult one. On the one hand, Du Pont would suffer 
no ostensible detriment from the exchange of its shares for a -
~ greater number of its shares; on the other hand, Du Pont would 
never agree to an arm's-length transaction which benefits it so 
-
~~~ ~:~cr- ~,.~,. ~~)'\ _j.J'\~ .. 
~-)I~ ~ -~/ 9-o• }) \P:. @P" 
'"' ~ _.-.}(· ~~ -8- \J / ~ 
UJ.J '-o ~o· / / 91~ v :X · . , 
slightly and the other\.siu~ s 9 greatly witho attempting to ~ -. ~.J 
~ / ~,·· 
negotiate a portion of the itself. In effect, ~~~ 
.D\1) C? CTV\'·t- '').trY ' 
the affiliation of Du Pont and ch,zistian caused the . . ·-
1 
~ ~ .J 
shareholders to bear an opportunity equal to the amount ~~~ 
that an arm's-length merger partner would "pay" DuPont to ~ 
induce it to enter into the transaction. 
CA 8 rested heavily upon the fact that, using the market 
value of Christiana stock as the measurement standard, Du Pont 
would have received far less than would the Christiana shareholders, 
./ 
who would have received a 28.5% premium -- about a half billion 
dollars -- for their stock. One of the most significant factors 
causing this 28.5% discount is the unrealized cap i tal gains tax 
liability inherent in Christiana's DuPont stock. However, in 
a tax free reorganization, Christiana shareholders would get a 
I 
carry-over basis. See I.R.C. § 358. Since the basis of the 
. h 1. . . . . . 
C r1st1ana stock 1n the hands of 1ts shareholders JS also qu1te 
low -- see appendix at 88a -- there would also be a very 
substantial unrealized capital gains tax inhering in the 
Du Pont stock. Hence, the "bonanza" --
not as large as CA 8 would have us believ 
"new" 
large 
extent the effect of unrealized capital gains will depress the 
here ~ay dstill be signhificant ~ax1 afdvadntabge1 s since.this ~ ~-~ Pafisact1on oes erase t e potent1a or ou e taxat1on _ 
I~ 
. -- i.e., due to the disparities (1) between the bas]s of 
Christiana's DuPont stock and DuPont market value, and (2) 
between the basis of Christiana's shares in the hands of jts 
shareholders and Christiana's market value. 
( -9-
intrinsic value of the new Du Pont shares to the sa~ extent ----that it did the market value of Christiana shares. -
At any rate, the issue of whether, in fact, the merger 
terms were "fair" under section 17 is ' intriguing, although 
perhaps not certworthy per se. 
Although the SEC attempts to urge otherwise, the proper 
standard for valuation of investment companies for purposes of 
section 17 does not appear, standing alone, to be important 
eno~gh, recurrent enough, or confused enough to command this 
Court's attention. 
The primary impetus for cert must flow from the approach -----
used by CA 8 in reversing the SEC. CA 8 characterized the 
SEC as holding, as a matter of law, that the net asset value 
standard is the appropriate standard under which to measure 
I 
I 
value. CA 8 thus found the SEC "wrong on the law." 
-------~ ._.41Wii11~ ... -----..-----
This approach strikes me as a rather thinly veiled attempt 
at evading the review standards set forth in Chenery and i n 
.Y 
section 43(a) of the 1940 Act. I do not read the SEC's opinion 
as"holding" the net asset value standard necessary as a matter 
of law. Valuation is the key to fairness; value js a factual 
question and the SEC's use of net asset value in the case of an 
.1/Section 43 (a) provides, inter alia: "the findings of the Commissjon 
as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be 
conclusive. 
-10- -investment company is supportable, and not an error of law (at 
least until CA 8 found it to be so.) Thus, the SEC's conclusions 
do seem to be supported by substantial evidence, and by the SEC's 
factual analysis, and should have been protected on appeal. 
The mere fact that CA 8 had to hire the consultant to help 
it "understand the record" only illustrates the deference that 
CA 8 should have given, but did not give, to the SEC determinations. 
Moreover, this Court has only recently warned courts of appeal to 
stay within the record on review. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas 
Pipe Line Corp., 44 U.S.L.W. 3413 (January 19, 1976). 
The fact that CA 8 arguably disregarded the proper standard 
review argues for some action by this Court. However, there is 
no argument below about what that standard is; the only real 
issue therein is whether CA 8 effectively circumnavigated the 
deferential standard of review by casting the SEC's employment of 
net asset value as an error of law. Thus, if cert were to be 
--granted, what this Court might really end up doing is addressing 
There is a response. 




§ 17 (a) It shall be unlawful for any affiliated 
person or promoter of or principal undenuiter 
for a registered investment company (other than 
a company of the character described in f'ection 
80a-12(d)(3)(A) and (B) of this title), or any 
affiliated person of such a person, promoter, or 
principal undenrriter, acting as principal-
(!) knowingly to sell any security or other 
property to such reg-istered company or to 
any company controlled by such registered 
company, ... 
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this 
section, any person may file with the Commission 
an application for an order exempting a proposed 
transaction of the applicant from one or more 
provisions of said subsection. The Colil.Iill ssion 
shall grant such application and issue such order 
of exemption if evidence establishes that-
(1) the terms of the proposed transaction, 
including the consideration to be paid or 
received, are reasonable and fair and do not 
involve O\erreaching on the part of any per-
son concerned; 
(2) the proposed transaction is consistent 
with the polic~~ of each registered investment 
company concerned, as recited in its regis-
tration statement and reports filed under this 
subchapter; and 
(3) the proposed transaction is consistent 
with the general purposes of this subchapter. 
.. 
• . 
. .:; .• 
. ·: 
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chapter may obtain a re\·Iew or sncu uJ. u\;.. ~.u 
the United States Court of Appeals \Yit.hin any 
circuit wncrein such per~on resides or has his 
principal plnce of business. or in the United 
States Conrt. of A ppcals for the District of 
Columbia, by filin~ in l'uch rnurt, within sixty 
days after the entry of such order, a written 
petition pra~·ing that the order of the Conunis-
sion be modified or set aside in whole or in part. 
* * * Upon the filing of such petition such court 
shall haYe the jurisdiction, which upon the filing 
of the record shall be exclusive, to afiirm, modi-
fy, or set aside such order, in whole or in part. 
No objection to the order of the Commission 
shall be considered bv the court unless such ob-
jection shall have beei1 urged before the Collll11is-
sion or unless there were reasonable grounds for 
failure so to do. The findings of the Commission 
as to the facts, if supported by substantial evi-
dence, shall be conclusive. If application is made 
to the court for leave to adduce additional e-vi-
dence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the 
court that such additional evidence is material 
and that there were reasonable grounds for fail-
ure to adduce such eYidence in the proceeding be-
fore the Commission, the court may order such 
additional evidence to be taken before the Com-
mission and to be adduced upon the bearing in 
such manner and upon such terms and conditions 
as to the court may seem proper. The Commission 
may modify its findings as to the facts by reason 
of the additional cYidence so taken, and it shall 
file :with the court such modified or new findings, 
which, if supported by substantial evidence, shall 
be conclusive, and its recommendation, if any, 
for the modification or setting aside of the origin-
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TO: MRo JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: Gene Corney 
RE: Nos. 75-1870 & 75-1872, SEC v. Collins 
BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO 
When the petitions for cert first came before the Conference, 
I recommended that you vote to grant in these two cases. I was then 
of the view that CA8 failed to give appropriate deference to the SEC's 
interpretation of the statute (which the SEC was charged to enforce). 
After considering this matter carefully on the merits, I am now of 
the view that the SEC is wrong and CA8 is right: net asset value is 
not the determinative factor with respect to the "fairness" of mergers 
o f this sort. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Under section 17 of the Act, mergers between investment companies 
and their affiliates can be consummated only if the SEC finds that 
t hey are "reasonable and fair and do not involve overreaching on 
the part of any person concernedo" The SEC has generally note required 
as a precondition to its approval that the parties to the merger 
apportion the benefits generated by the merger. The issue is 
whether this is the correct approach to the statute. 
Christiana's only alternative to a merger with du Pont would have 
been liquidation under section 333 of the IRC, which could have re-
sulted in a tax liability of between 8.5% and 17o2% of Christiana's 
assets measured by their market value. The SEC approved the tax free 
merger between du Pont and Christiana, even though it recognized the 
@ 
clear "imbalance of benefit" in the terms of the merger. As the SEC 
viewed the transaction, the merger with the 2.5% discount would 
not injure the du Pont shareholders. And it is clear that it would 
help the Christiana shareholders by maintaining subttantially the 
entire value of their investment. The SEC thus found the merger to 
be within the "range of fairness'' mandated by the statute. CAB reversed, 
finding significant the gross disparity in benefits between the two 
groups of shareholders. 
B. THE CONCEPT OF FAIRNESS 
I gather from the briefs that we are not going to get much 
help from the legislative history with respect to whether Congress 
thought this type of merger was fair or unfair. As an economist, 
I find it easiest to treat the concept of "fairness" with respect to 
deals in terms of what the market will bear. If for now we put 
to one side the problems involved when the transaction is, for one 
reason or another, not an arm's length bargain, a "fair" price is 
the market price. When two parties negotiate a transaction, it is 
usually because there are benefits to be gained by both sides. The 
distribution of those benefits will depend on relative bargaining 
strength: how badly do you need what the other fellow has to offer. 
In other words, the terms of the bargain depend on what each party 
brings to the bargain and how badly the other party needs it. 
,, 
This view finds support in some of our cases dealing with 
the concept of a "just and reasonable" standard. For example, in 
Schwabacher v. United States, 334 u.s. 182, 199, we interpreted the 
just and reasonable" standard of the Transportation Act of 1940 ~ 
as requiring that it is not what a stockholder "once put into a 
constituent company but what value he is contributing to the merger 
that is to be made good." 
It is of course possible to argue that Christiana is bringing 
to this merger its assej ts--primarily du Pont stock--since the effect 
of the proposed merger is a transfer of those assests o Under that 
view, one could then argue that Christiana's compe~sation should be 
valued not on the a market value of its stock, but on the market 
value of its assets. The problem with that approach is that itJ 
takes only a superficial look at the transactiono The purpose of 
this transaction is not to bring to duPont Christiana's assets; 
standing alone, there is no economic incentive for du Pont to purchase 
from Christiana its own shares and then reissue new shares in their 
place. The real purpose behind this transaction is to realize the 
substantial tax benefits that flow from this type of tax free merger. 
From this view, what Christiana br:i.ags to du Pont is an oppo:.::.tunity 
fur the two to get together and accomplish a tax savings that will be 
unavailable to Christina if it pursued any of its other options o 
Christiana needs du Pont badly in this transaction, since du Pont is 
the only available party which can accomplish tax free status o 
And Christiana brings with it an opportunity for a huge tax savings. 
Du Pont of course brings to the bargain the other side of the coin: 
it brings the opportunity for tax free status and is no doubt willing 
to accept part of the tax "bounty" in exchange for its role in the deal. 
If these two parties got together and worked out an arrangement 
at arm's length, I am certain that the terms of the deal would have 
been far different than those approved by the SECo 
? 
' 
C. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR "UNFAIRNESS" 
The SEC enters this case precisely because Congress recognized 
,.·a"·· f··cMA.l 
that certain transactions involvet a ~ opportunity for unfairnesso 
With respect to affiliated companies, Congress wanted to deal with 
the possibility that the "dominant" firm would force unfair terms 
upon, and thereby injure, the "minor" firm. Thus, Congress required 
that the SEC give prior approval only to those mergers between affiliated 
companies that were "fair and reasonable and did not involve overreaching 
on the part of any person concerned." 
If one presented the facts of this case to a group of economists 
and a sked them to explain the factors influencing the terms of this 
/? bargain now before us, I am absolutely certain that the oonsensus 
\ would be that Christiana controlled or influenced the du Pont decision 
to accept the terms through something other than the legitimate 
exercise of bargaining power at arm's length. Here, Christiana is 
the dominant party, the merger provides an opportunity for it to 
obtain terms more favorable than it would otherwise obtain, and the 
terms in fact turn out to exhibit a clear imbalance. Why then 
should the merger be approved as fair and reasonable? 
The only reason I can think of is that it is important to 
preserve the net asset value of shares in investment companies. 
v ... v iou.s 
This may well be part of the purpose of theAprovisions of the statute 
at issue. But the very provision under scrutiny at this time requires 
fairness to ALL parties to the bargain, which means du Pont as well 
as Christiana. Moreover, here it is Christiana which is the 
r1 
domin~ party, and if either party is to be preferred it should be 
Du Pont. 
It might nonetheless be contended that the du Pont shareholders 
should not complain that the deal is unfair, since there is likely 
to be no effect on the price of their shares and the value of 
their investment. But that is a rather odd concept of fairness: your 
present position remains unchanged. ~\ In a very meaningful cpp9~~A1E~ 
du Pont shareholders are injured--they have missed a good 
corporate opportunity. Take the following hypothetical, which probably 
sounds familiar. Suppose Christiana's assets consisted solely of 
IBM stock. Also assume that du Pont had ten shares of common outstanding, 
with ten shareholders each holding one share. Two of the du Pont 
shareholders also happen to ~ two shareholders of Christiana. 
Indeed, we can even assume that they are the two only shareholders 
of Christiana. Now let's suppose that due to some quirk in the 
tax laws the Christiana shareholders can merge with du Pont and 
only du Pont to realize the same tax savings as is at issue in this 
~....,____ 
case. So the two Christiana shareholders go to duPont management 
and say: look, if we merge with you in this fashion the value of 
du Pont shares will remain unchanged, and we can ourselves realize 
this ~uge tax savings. Since we also happen to be du Pont shareholders, 
why don't you do us this favor and let us reap this 100,000 tax benefit. 
The duPont management would be crazy if it didn't insist on 
sharing the tax savings with the Christiana people. The fact that 
the Christiana shareholders also happen to be duPont shareholders, 
and that du Pont shares would not decrease in value is irrelevant. 
If duPont insists on a 50/50 split of the tax savings, each duPont 
.a.hareholder would "get" 1/10 th of 50,000, or 5, 000. This is true tJA ~ 
of the two christiana shareholders who are du Pont shareholders. 
But if du Pont instead insists on no share of the benefit, or as 
rere only a marginal share, the full value goes to the two Christiana 
shareholders--who are also du Pont shareholders--at 50,000 each. 
What reason is there for such a result1 
Du Pont management would never enter into such a deal knowingly 
and voluntarily. If the deal went through under the terms proposed 
in the instant case, the presumption would be that du Pont management 
was negligent, that it had been coerced by the controlling influence 
of Christiana, or that du Pont management had colluded with the 
Christiana shareholders for an under- the- table share of the tax 
evings. With management as sophisticated as it is today, I think 
we can reject the first possible inference as unrealistic. With 
respect to either of the other two possibilities, the deal is 
inherently unfair and unreasonable to du Pont stockholders. 
D. THE ROOT PROBLEM 
A good deal of confusion can be caused by looking at this case 
in terms of whether Christiana shareholders are "entitled" to the 
tax ~benefits in the first place, and whether it is unfair to deprive 
them of the benefits to which they are entitled. In my view, the 
Christiana shareholders long ago attached certain restrictions and 
limitations on their shares by putting them into this holding company. 
They did so for good reason: they wanted to use Christiana as a control 
device . The fact that that control device has outlived its useful-
ness does not mean that they should ~ be able to avoid the restrictions 
placed on their shares without paying for the fact those retrictions 
brought them benefits for a number of years. 
~ 
The very purp~ose of the 
Act seems to be to keep Christiana from forcing a "bad deal" on 
du Pont. To say that the deal if is"fair" since it does not injure 
du Pont stops at a superficial level. The deal is fair since you 
didn't get hurt in terms of a decline in present value. But the 
deal is appropriately characterized as a~bad deal~ -and thus in my 
view as an unfair deal--because du Pont share~olders lost the 
opportunity to increase the value of what they owned. 
I realize that we normally give considerable deference to 
the interpretation of a statute offered by the agency charged with 
enforcement of the statute. But this interpretation makes no 
economic sense, and I would reject the agency's interpretation. 
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No. 75-1872 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Collins 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE 
Court. 
.!/ 
We granted certiorari in this case 
whether the Securities and Exchange Commission, in approving 
the merger of a closed-end investment company into an 
affiliate company, reasonably exercised its discretion under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT 789, as a~ended, 
15 U.S.C. §80a-l et seq. The Commission valued the investment 
company essentially on the basis of the market value of the 
securities which constituted substantially all of its assets 
rather than on the lower basis of its own outstanding stock. 
The statutory scheme here is relatively straightforward. 
Section 17 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 u.s.c. 
80(a)-17, forbids an "affiliated person," as defined in the 
1/ 
- 429 u.s. 815 (1976) . 
- 2 -
~I 
Act, to purchase any securities or other property from a 
registered investment company unless the Commission finds, 
inter alia, that the "evidence establishes that ... the 
terms of the proposed transaction, including the consideration 
to be paid or received, are reasonable and fair and do not 
involve overreaching on the part of any person concerned. . 
2/ 
- 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a) (3) defines an "affiliated person" 
as follows: 
(3) "Affiliated person" of another person 
means (A) any person directly or indirectly owning, 
controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5 per 
centum or more of the outstanding voting securities 
of such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum 
or more of whose outstanding voting securities are 
directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held 
with power to vote, by such other person; (C) any 
person directly or indirectly controlling, 
controlled by, or under common control with, such 
other person; (D) any officer, director, partner, 
copartner, or employee of such other person; 
(E) if such other person is an investment company, 
any investment adviser thereof or any member of an 
advisory board thereof; and (F) if such other 
person is an unincorporated investment company not 
having a board of directors, the depositor thereof. 
3/ 
-Section 17(b) also requires that: i- the 
proposed transaction be consistent with the policy of each 
registered investment company concerned, and ii -
consistent with "the general purposes of this subchapter." 






(l) The merger in this case involves Christiana Securities 
Company, a closed-end, non-diversified management investment 
company, and E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company, a large 
industrial operating company engaged principally in the 
manufacture of chemical products. Christiana was formed in o( 
1915 in order to preserve family control of~ DuPont J 
~- At the time the present merger negotiations were 
announced in April 1972, 98% of Christiana's assets consisted 
4/ 
of Du Pont common stock.- This block of Du Pont stock in 
turn comprised approximately 28.3% of the outstanding common 
5/ 
stock of the Du Pont Corporation.- For purposes of this 
litigation, Christiana has been presumed to have at least the 
potential to control Du Pont, although it submits that "this 
potential lies dormant and unexercised and that there is no 
actual control relationship." Investment Company Act Release 
No. 8615/December 13, 1974, 5 S.E.C. Docket 745, 747 (1974). 
4/ 
-Christiana owns 13,417,120 shares of DuPont, It also 
holds a relatively small amount of Du Pont preferred stock. 
Its other assets consist of two daily newspapers in 
Wilmington, Delaware and 3.5% of the stock of the Wilmington 
Trust Company which, in turn, holds more than one half of 
Christiana's common stock as trustee. Investment Company Act 
Release No. 8615/December 13, 1974. 
5/ 
-According to the applicants' "Notice of Filing of 
Application", Investment Company Act Release No. 7402, DuPont 
has 47,566,694 shares of common stock outstanding held by 
approximately 224,964 shareholders. 
- 4 -
Christiana itself has 11,710,103 shares of common stock 
6/ 
outstanding- and has about eight thousand shareholders. 
Unlike Du Pont stock, which is traded actively on the New York 
and other national stock exchanges, Christiana shares are 
traded in the over-the-counter market. Since virtually all of 
its assets are Du Pont common stock, the market price of 
Christiana shares reflects the market price of Du Pont stock. 
However, as is~ case with closed-end investment 
companies, Christiana's own stock has historically sold at a 
7/ 
discount from the market value of its Du Pont holdings.-
Apparently, this disdount is primarily tax-related since 
Christiana pays a federal intercorporate tax on dividends. Its 
~~~A~ 
stockholders are also subject to pote~ial capital gains tax 
A 
on the unrealized appreciation of Christiana's Du Pont stock 
which has a very low tax base. Additionally, the relatively 
limited market for Christiana stock likely influences the 
discount. ~ 
In 1972, Christiana's management concluded that, because 
of the tax disadvantages and the discount at which its shares 
y 
95.5% of these shares are held by 338 people. 
Investment Company Act Release No. 8615/December 13, 1974. 
!_I 
In the two years preceding the date of the announcement 
of the merger negotiations, this discount was generally in 
the range of 20-25%. Investment Company Act Release No. 8615, 
December 13, 1974. 
- 5 -
sold, Christiana should be liquidated and its stockholders 
become direct owners of Du Pont stock. Christiana's board 
of directors proposed liquidation of Christiana by means of a 
tax-free merger into Du Pont Corporation. Du Pont would 
purchase Christiana's assets by issuing to Christiana share-
holders new certificates of Du Pont stock. In more concrete 
terms, Du Pont would acquire Christiana's $2.2 billion assets 
and assume its liabilities of approximately $300,000. In so 
doing, DuPont would acquire from Christiana 13,417,120 shares 
of its own common stock. DuPont would then issue 13,228,620 
of its shares directly to Christiana holders. This would be 
188,500 shares less than Du Pont would receive from Christiana 
a ratio of 1.123 shares of Du Pont for each share of 
Christiana. This ratio was ascertained by taking the market 
price of Christiana's DuPont stock and its other assets, 
subtracting Christiana's relatively nominal liabilities, and 
making certain other minor adjustments. Direct ownership of 
Du Pont shares would increase the market value of the 
Christiana shareholders' holdings and Du Pont would have 
acquired Christiana's assets at a 2.5% discount from their net 
value. The Internal Revenue Service ruled the merger would be 
tax-free. 
(2) Du Pont and Christiana filed a joint application with the 
Commission for exemption under §17 of the Investment Company 
- 6 -
Act. Administrative proceedings followed. The Commission's 
Division of Investment Management Regulation supported the 
application. A relatively small number of Du Pont shareholders, 
including the respondents in this case, opposed the transaction. 
Their basic argument was that, since Christiana was valued on 
the basis of its assets, Du Pont stock, rather than the much 
lower market price of its own outstanding stock, the proposed 
merger would be unfair to the shareholders of Du Pont since it 
provides relatively greater benefits to Christiana shareholders 
than to shareholders of Du Pont. The objecting stockholders 
argued that Du Pont Corporation should receive a substantial 
share of the benefit realized by Christiana shareholders from 
the elimination of the 23% discount from net asset value at 
which Christiana stock was selling. They also argued that the 
merger would depress the market price of Du Pont stock because 
it would place more than 13 million marketable Du Pont shares 
directly in the hands of Christiana shareholders. 
After the hearing, the parties waived the initial adminis-
trative recommendations and the record was submitted directly 
to the Commission. The Commission unanimously granted the 
application. Basically, it viewed the proposed transaction as 
an exchange of equivalents - Christiana's Du Pont stock to be 
acquired by Du Pont in exchange for Du Pont stock issued 
directly to Christiana shareholders. It held that, for purposes 
- 7 -
of §17(b), the proper guide for evaluating Christiana was the 
market price of Christiana's holdings of DuPont stock: 
''Here justice requires no ventures into the unknown 
and . the unknowable. An investment company, whose 
assets consist entirely or almost entirely of 
securities, the prices of which are determined in 
active and continuous markets, can normally be 
presumed to be worth its net asset value .... 
The simple, readily usable-tool of net asset value 
does the job much better than an accurate guage 
of market impact (were there one) could." 5 S.E.C. 
Docket, at 751. 
The fact that Du Pont might have obtained more favorable 
terms because of its strategic bargaining position or by use 
of alternative methods of liquidating Christiana was considered 
not relevant by the Commission. In its view, the purpose of §17 
was to prevent persons in a strategic position from getting more 
than fair value. The Commission found no detriment in the 
transaction to Du Pont or to the value of its outstanding 
shares. Any depressing effects on the price of Du Pont would 
be brief in duration and the intrinsic value of an investment 
in Du Pont would not be altered by the merger. Moreover, in the 
Commission's view, any valuation involving a significant 
departure from net asset value would "run afoul of §17(b) (1) of 
the Act"; it would strip long-term investors in companies like 
Christiana of the intrinsic worth of the securities which 
underlie their holdings. 
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit divided in setting aside the Commission's 
- 8 -
8/ 
determination. 532 F.2d 584 (1976) .- The majority held 
that the Securities and Exchange Commission had erred, as a 
matter of law, in determining that Christiana should be 
presumptively valued on the basis of the market value of its 
principal asset, common stock of Du Pont. "[I]n judging 
transactions between dominant and subserviant parties, the 
test is 'whether or not under all the circumstances the trans~ 
action carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain' 
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-307 (1939) (footnote 
omitted)," 532 F.2d, at 592. Employing this standard, the 
Court of Appeals majority concluded the record did not support 
the Commission's finding that the terms of the merger were 
"reasonable and fair" since the "economic benefits to Christiana 
shareholders from the merger are immediate and substantial," 
532 F.2d, at 601, while "benefits to present Du Pont share-
holders are minimal." Id., at 602. The court concluded that, 
from DuPont's viewpoint, "the degree of [control] dispersion 
attained . . . does not justify the substantial premium paid 
for the Christiana stock," id., at 603. The panel also held 
that the Commission had erred in failing to give weight to the 
"occasional detriment to DuPont shareholders," id., at 605, 
caused by the increase of available Du Pont stock in the market. 
8/ 
- A petition for rehearing en bane was denied by an 
equally divided court. 
- 9 - ' . 
B 
In determining whether the Court of Appeals correctly 
set aside the order of the Commission, we begin by examining 
the nature of the regulatory process whose decision that court 
was required to review. In United States v. National Assn. of 
Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975), we noted that the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §80a-l et seq, "vests 
in the SEC broad regulatory authority over the business 
practices of the investment companies." 422 U.S., at 704-705. 
The Act was the product of Congressional concern that existing 
legislation in the securities field did not afford adequate 
protection to the purchasers of investment company securities. 
Prior to the enactment of the legislation, Congress mandated 
9/ 
an intensive study of the investment company industry.- One 
of the problems specifically identified was the numerous trans-
actions between investment companies and persons affiliated 
with them which resulted in a distinct advantage to the 
10/ 
"insiders" over the public investors.- Section 17 was the 
9/ 
- Section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 
49 STAT 837, 15 U.S.C. §792-4, mandated that Congress undertake 
such a study. See United States v. National Assn. of 
Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 704 (1975). 
10/ 
See generally Report on Investment Trust and Investment 
Companies, Pt. III, Ch. IV, "Problems in Connection with 
Shifts in Control, Mergers, and Consolidations of Investment 




specific Congressional response to this problem.-- Congress 
therefore charged the Commission, in scrutinizing a merger 
such as this, to take into account the peculiar characteristics 
of such a transaction in the investment company industry. 
Recognizing that an "arm's length bargain," cf. Pepper v. 
Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), is rarely a realistic possibility 
in transactions between an affiliate and an investment company, 
Congress substituted, in effect, the informed judgment of the 
Commission to determine, inter alia, whether the transaction 
was "reasonable and fair and did not involve overreaching on 
12/ 
the part of any person concerned.,,--
Given the wide variety of possible transactions between 
an investment company and its affiliates, Congress, quite 
understandably, made no attempt to define this standard with 
any greater precision. Instead, it followed the practice 
frequently employed in other administrative schemes. The 
language of the statute was cast in broad terms and designed to 
encompass all situations falling within the scope of the 
statute; an agency with great experience in the industry was 
While the House and Senate Reports indicate that the 
Congress' chief concern was protection of the public investors 
of the investment company, S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d 
Sess. 14 (1940); H. R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 9 
(1940), the statute has been construed to afford protection to 
the stockholders of the affiliate as well. See Fifth Avenue 
Coach Lines, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 635, 639 (1967). 
15 U.S.C. 80a-17 (b) (1). 
- 11 -
given the task of applying those criteria to particular 




In this case, a judgment as to whether the terms of the 
merger were "fair and reasonable" turned upon the value assigned 
to Christiana. In making such an evaluation, the Commission 
concluded that "[t]he single, readily usable tool of net asset 
value does the job much better than an accurate guage of market 
impact. " 5 S.E.C. Docket, at 751. Investment companies, 
it reasoned, are essentially a portfolio of securities whose 
individual prices are determined by the forces of the securities 
marketplace. In determining value in merger situations, "asset 
value" is thus much more applicable to investment companies 
than to other corporate entities. The value of the securities 
surrendered is, basically, the real value received by the 
transferee. 
13/ 
- This situation is quite different from that which 
confronted the Court earlier this Term in Piper v. Chris-Craft 
Industries, U.S. (1977). There, the Court held that 
"the narrow legal issue" of implying a private right of action 
under the securities laws was "one peculiarly reserved for 
judicial resolution" and that the experience of the Commission 
on such a question was of "limited value." U.S. n. 27. 
Moreover, the Commission's Chairman, in testimony before Congress 
on the relevant legislation, had taken a position opposed to 
that asserted by the Commission's amicus brief in Piper. By 
contrast, this case does not involve a purely legal determina-
tion but, rather, an assessment as to whether a given business 
arrangement is compatible with the regulatory scheme which the 
agency is charged by Congress to administer. 
- 12 -
In reviewing a decision of the Commission, a court must 
consider both the facts found and the application of the 
relevant statute by the agency. Congress has mandated that, 
in review of §17 proceedings, "[t)he findings of the 
Commission as to facts, if supported by substantial evidence, 
shall be conclusive." 15 U.S.C. §80a-42. A reviewing court 
is also to be guided by the "venerable principle that the 
construction of a statute by those charged with its execution 
should be followed unless there are compelling indications 
that it is wrong .... " Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367, 381 (1969). "[C)ontemporaneous construction is entitled 
to great weight ... even though it was applied in cases 
settled by consent rather than by litigation.'' FTC v. Mandel 
Bros., 359 U.S. 385 (1959). Here, however, the Court of Appeals 
held, as a matter of law, that the Commission erred in the method 
applied in passing on the merger, thus all but ignoring the 
Congressional limitations on judicial review of agency action. 
The Commission has long recognized that the key factor in 
the valuation of the assets of a closed-end investment company 
should be the market price of the underlying securitiesw This 
method of setting the value of investment companies is, as 
Congress contemplated, the product of the agency's long and 
intimate familiarity with the investment company industry. For 
instance, in issuing an advisory report to the United States 
- 13 - ' . 
District Court pursuant to Section 1703 of Chapter X of the 
Bankruptcy Act, the Commission advised that "it is natural 
that net asset value based upon market prices should be the 
fundamental valuation criterion used by and large in the 
investment company field." Central States Electric Corporation, 
30 S.E.C. 680, 700 (1949), approved, sub nom Central States 
Electric Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879, 884 (CA 4, 1950), 
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 917 (1951). Similarly, in mergers like 
the one presented in this case, the Commission has used "net 
asset value" as a touchstone in its analysis. See, e.g. 
Delaware Realty and Investment Company, 40 S.E.C. 469, 473 
(1961); Harbor Plywood Corp. and Hunt Foods and Industries, Inc., 
40 S.E.C. 1002 (1962); Eastern States Corporation, Investment 
14/ 
Company Act Releases Nos. 5693 and 5711 (1969).--
14/ 
-- This method of valuation of closed-end investment 
companies was similarly employed in Elt, Inc., Investment 
Company Act Release No. 8675 and 8714, Chemical Fund, Inc., 
Investment Company Act Release No. 8773, The Cit1zens and 
Southern Capital Corp., Investment Company Act Release No. 
7755 and 7802, Detroit and Clevand Navigation Company, Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 3082 and 3099, Cheapside Dollar 
Fund Limited, Investment Company Act Release No. 9038 and 9085, 
Abacus Fund, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 7053 and 
7094. The Commission has, of course, required that such 
valuations be adjusted to reflect such factors as expenses of 
the merger and tax considerations. Tally Industries, Inc., 
Investment Company Act Release No. 5953 and Electric Bond and 
Share Company, Investment Company Act Release No. 5215, cited 
by the Court of Appeals, did not rely on net asset value since 
the companies held substantial assets other than securities. 
While Christiana also had some assets other than Du Pont stock, 
theyamounted to only 2% of its assets. 
- 14 -
Moreover, despite the characterization of the Court of 
Appeals to the contrary, the Commission did not employ a 
mechanical application of a rule or "presumption". It 
considered carefully the contentions of the respondents that 
a departure from the use of net asset value was warranted in 
this case. Upon analysis, it concluded that the central and 
controlling aspect of the merger remained the fact that it 
consisted of an exchange of Du Pont common stock for Du Pont 
common stock; it was not Christiana stock but Du Pont stock 
which Du Pont was receiving ·in the merger. As to the claim 
that Du Pont stock would be adversely affected over an extended 
period of time by volume selling, the Commission concluded there 
was no indication of a long-term adverse market impact. It 
noted that Christiana stock was held principally by long-term 
investors . . There was no evidence that Christiana stockholders, 
who for years had been indirect investors in Du Pont, would now 
change the essential nature of their investment. 
The Commission's reliance on "net asset value" in this 
particular case and its consequent determination that the 
proposed merger met the statutory standards thus rested 
"squarely in that area where administrative judgments are 
entitled to the greatest amount of weight by the appellate 
courts. It is the product of administrative experience, 
appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization 
- 15 -
of the statutory policies, and reasonable treatment of the 
uncontested facts." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 
(1947). In rejecting the conclusion of the Commission, the 
Court of Appeals substituted its own judgment for that of the 
agency charged by Congress with that responsibility. Indeed, 
after receiving briefs in oral argument, the Court of Appeals -
over the objection of the Commission, Christiana and Du Pont -
undertook the unique appellate procedure of employing a 
university professor to assist the court in understanding the ----
record in this case and to prepare reports and memoranda for 
the court. Thus, the reports relied upon by that court included 
a variety of data and economic observations which had not been 
examined and tested by the traditional methods of the adversary 
process. We are not cited to any statute, rule, or decision 
authorizing the procedure employed by the Court of Appeals. 
Cf. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 16. 
In our view, the Court of Appeals clearly departed from 
its statutory appellate function and applied an erroneous 
standard in its review of the decision of the Commission. The 
record made by the parties before the Commission was in accord 
with traditional procedures and that record clearly reveals 
substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commission. 
Moreover, the agency conclusions of law were based on a 
construction of the statute consistent with the legislative 
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We granted certiorari 1 in this case to determine whether 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, in approving the 
merger of a closed end investment company into an affiliate 
company, reasonably exercised its discretion under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 
('. S. C. ~ 80a- 1 et seq. The Commission valued the invest-
ment company essentially on the basis of the market value of 
the securities which constituted substantially all of its assets 
rather than on the lower basis of its own outstanding stock. 
The statutory scheme here is relatively straightforward. 
Section 17 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. 
'iO (a)-17, forbids an "affiliated person," as defined in the Act/ 
1 ,129 lT. :::l. 815 (1976) . 
" Title 15 U. S. C. 80a-2 (a) (:3) definp;,; an •·affi liated pPrson" as follows: 
(3) "Affiliated per::;on" of another person means (A) any person directly 
or mrlirect ly owning, cont rolling, or holding with power to vote, 5 per 
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to purchase any securities or other property from a registered 
investment company unless the Commission finds, inter alia, 
that the "evidence establishes that . . . the terms of the 
proposed transaction, including the consideration to be paid or 
received, are reasonable and fair and do not involve over-
rea,ching on the part of any person concerned. " 8 
A 
( 1) The merger in this case involves Christiana Securities 
Company, a closed end, nondiversified management invest-
ment company, and E. I. duPont de Nemours and Company, 
a large industrial operating company engaged principally in 
the manufacture of chemical products. Christiana wa3 
formed in 1915 in order to preserve family control of the 
Du Pont Corporation. At the time the present merger nego-
tiations were announced in April 1972, 98ro of Christiana's 
assets consisted of Du Pont common stock.4 This block of 
Du Pont stock in turn comprised approximately 28.3% of the 
outstanding common stock of the DuPont Corporation.5 For 
centum or more of the outstanding· voting securities ef such other person; 
(B) any per::jon 5 per centum or more of whose outstanding voting 
:;ecurities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled_, or held with power 
to vote, by ~uch other per::;on; (C) any person di.rectly or indirectly 
<'Ontrolling, cqntrolled by, or under common control with, such other 
per;;on; (D) any officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of 
-;uch other per::>on; (E) if ~:;uch other per::;on is an investment company, 
ally mvcstment adviser thereof or any member of an advisory board 
thereof; and (F) if such other person is an unincorporated investment 
rompany not having a board of directors, the depositor thereof. 
3 Section 17 (b) also requires that: i-t he proposed transaction be con-
,;istent with the policy of each registered investment company con-
C'(' rned, and iJt-consistent with "the general purposes of this subchapter." 
15 U. S. C. § 80a-17 (b) (2) (3) These criteria are not contested here. 
4 Chri::;tiana own;; 13,417,120 ~hares of Du Pont. It also holds a rela-
t 1vely small amount of Du Pont preferred stock. Its other assets con-
~i~t of two daily new::;paper::: in Wilmington, DeL, and 3.5% of the 
~tock of the Wilmington Trust Company which, in turn, holds more than 
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purposes of this litigation, Christiana has been presumed to 
have at least the potential to control Du Pont, although it 
submits that "this potential lies dormant and unexercised and 
that there is no actual control relationship." Investment 
Company Act Release No. 8615/December 13, 1974, 5 S. E. C. 
Docket 745, 747 (1974). 
Christiana itself has 11,710,103 shares of common stock 
outstanding 6 and has about 8,000 shareholders. Unlike 
DuPont stock, which is traded actively on the New York and 
other national stock exchanges, Christiana shares are traded in 
the over-the-counter market. Since virtually all of its assets 
are Du Pont common stock, the market price of Christiana 
shares reflects the market price of Du Pont stock. However, 
as is often the case with closed end investment companies, 
Christiana's own stock has historically sold at a discount from 
the market value of its Du Pont holdings.7 Apparently, this 
discount is primarily tax related since Christiana pays a fed-
eral intercorporate tax on dividends. Its stockholders are 
also subject to potential capital gains tax on the unrealized 
appreciation of Christiana's Du Pont stock which has a very 
low tax base. Additionally, the relatively limited market for 
Christiana stock likely influences the discount. 
In 1972, Christiana's management concluded that, because 
of the tax disadvantages and the discount at which its shares 
sold, Christiana should be liquidated and its stockholders 
become direct owners of Du Pont stock. Christiana's board 
one-half of Christiana's common stock as trustee. Investment Company 
Act Relea-se No. 8615/December 13, 1974. 
5 According to the applicants' "Notice of Filing of Application," Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 7402, Du Pont has 47,566,694 shares of 
common stock outt;t..-mding held by npproximiltely 224,964 shareholders. 
0 95.5% of the::;e sha.res are held by 338 people. Investment Company 
A.ct Release No. 8615/DecembPr 13, 1974. 
7 In the two yrar~ preceding the date of the announcement of the 
merger negotiation~, this discount was generally in the range of 20-25%. 
I uvestment C01;npany Act Rclense No 8615, December 13, 1974. 
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of directors proposed liquidation of Christiana by means of a 
tax-free merger into Du Pont Corporation. Du Pont would 
purchase Christiana's assets by issuing to Christiana share-
holders new certificates of Du Pont stock. In more concrete 
terms, Du Pont would acquire Christiana's $2.2 billion assets 
and assume its liabilities of approximately $300,000. In so 
doing, Du Pont would acquire from Christiana 13,417,120 
shares of its own common stock. Du Pont would then issue 
13,228,620 of its shares directly to Christiana holders. This 
would be 188,500 shares less than Du Pont would receive from 
Christiana-a ratio of 1.123 shares of Du Pont for each share 
of Christiana. This ratio was ascertained by taking the mar-
ket price of Christiana's Du Pont stock and its other assets, 
subtracting Christiana's relatively nominal liabilities, and 
making certain other minor adjustments. Direct ownership 
of Du Pont shares would increase the market value of the 
Christiana shareholders' holdings and Du Pont would have 
acquired Christiana's assets at a 2.5% discount from their net 
value. The Internal Revenue Service ruled the merger would 
be tax free. 
(2) Du Pont and Christiana filed a joint application with 
the Commission for exemption under § 17 of the Investment 
Company Act. Administrative proceedings followed. The 
Commission's Division of Investment Management Regula-
tion supported the application. A relatively small number of 
Du Pont shareholders, including the respondents in this case, 
opposed the transaction. Their basic argument was that, 
since Christiana was valued on the basis of its assets, Du Pont 
stock, rather than the much lower market price of its own 
outstanding stock, the proposed merger would be unfair to the 
shareholders of Du Pont since it provides relatively greater 
benefits to Christiana shareholders than to shareholders of 
Du Pont. The objectmg stockholders argued that Du Pont 
Corporation should receive a substantial share of the benefit 
realized by Christiana shareholders from the elimination of 
' . 
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the 23o/o discount from net asset va.lue at which Christiana 
stock was selling. They also argued that the merger would 
depress the market price of Du Pont stock because it would 
place more than 13 million marketable Du Pont shares directly 
in the hands of Christiana shareholders. 
After the hearing, the parties waived the initial adminis-
trative recommendations a.nd the record was submitted 
directly to the Commission. The Commission unanimously 
granted the application. Basically, it viewed the proposed 
transaction as a.n exchange of equivalents-Christiana's 
Du Pont stock to be acquired by Du Pont in exchange for 
Du Pont stock issued directly to Christiana shareholders. It 
held that, for purposes of § 17 (b), the proper guide for 
evaluating Christiana was the market price of Christiana's 
holdings of DuPont stock: 
"Here justice requires no ventures into the unknown and 
the unknowable. An investment company, whose assets 
consist entirely or almost entirely of securities, the prices 
of which are determined in active and continuous mar-
kets, can normally be presumed to be worth its net asset 
value. . . . The simple, readily usable tool of net asset 
value does the job much better than an accurate guage of 
market impact (were there one) could." 5 S. E. C. 
Docket, at 751. 
The fact that Du Pont might have obtained more favorable 
tPrms because of its strategic bargaining position or by use of 
alternative methods of liquidating Christiana was considered 
110t relevant by the Commission. In its view, the purpose of 
~ 17 was to prevent persons in a strategic position from getting 
more than fair value. The Commission found no detriment 
in the transaction to Du Pont or to the value of its outsta.nd-
i 11g shares. Any depressing effects on the price of Du Pont 
would be brief in duration and the intrinsic value of an invest-
mrnt in Du Pont would not be altered by the merger. More-
over, in the Commission's view, any valuation involving a 
' . 
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significant departure from net asset value would "run afoul of 
§ 17 (b)(1) of the Act"; it would strip long-term investors in 
companies like Christiana of the intrinsic worth of the 
securities which underlie their holdings. 
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit divided in setting aside the Commission's 
determination. 523 F. 2d 584 (1976).8 The majority held 
that the Securities and Exchange Commission had erred, as a 
matter of law, in determfning that Christiana should be pre-
sumptively valued on the basis of the market value of its 
principal asset, common stock of Du Pont. "[I]n judging 
transactions between dominant and subserviant pa.rties, the 
test is 'whether or not under all the circumstances the trans-
action carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain' 
Peppe'r v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 306-307 ( 1939) (footnote 
omitted)," 532 F. 2d, at 592. Employing this standard, the 
Court of Appeals majority concluded the record did not sup-
port the Commission's finding that the terms of the merger 
were "reasonable and fair" since the "economic benefits to 
Christiana shareholders from the merger are immediate and 
substantial,'' 532 F. 2d, at 601, while "benefits to present 
Du Pont shareholders are minimal." I d., at 602. The court 
concluded that, from Du Pont's viewpoint, "the degree of 
[control] dispersion attained ... does not justify the sub-
stantial premium pa.id for the Christiana stock," id., at 603. 
The panel also held that the Commission had erred in failing 
to give weight to the "occasional detriment to Du Pont share-
holders," id., a.t 605, caused by the increase of available 
Du Pont stock in the market. 
B 
In determining whether the Court of Appeals correctly set 
aside the order of the Commission, we begin by examining the 
nature of the regulatory process whose decision that court was 
~ A prtition for rchn.ring en bane was denied by an equally dividect 
t:OI'Jrt. 
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required to review. In United States v. National Assn. of 
Securities Dea.lers, 422 U. S. 694 (1975), we noted that the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-1 et seq., 
"vests in the SEC broad regulatory authority over the business 
practices of the investment companies." 422 U. S., at 704-
705. The Act was the product of congressional concern that 
existing legislation in the securities field did not afford ade-
quate protection to the purchasers of investment company 
securities. Prior to the enactment of the legislation, Congress 
mandated an intensive study of the investment company 
industry.9 One of the problems specifically identified was the 
numerous transactions between investment companies and 
persons affiliated with them which resulted in a distinct 
advantage to the "insiders" over the public investors.10 Sec-
tion 17 was the specific congressional response to this prob-
lem.11 Congress therefore charged the Commission. in 
scrutinizing a merger such as this, to take into account the 
peculiar characteristics of such a transaction in the invest-
ment company industry. Recognizing that an "arm's length 
bargain." cf. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), is rarely 
a realistic possibility in transactions between an affiliate and 
an investment company, CongTess substituted, in effect, the 
informed judgment of the Commission to determine, inter alia, 
n Section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 STAT 837, 
15 U. S. C. § 792-4, mandated that, Congress undertake such a study. 
See United States v. National Assn. of Sec'U1'ities Dealers, 422 U. S. 694, 
704 (1975) . 
"JO See gcnernlly Report on Investment Trust and Investment Companies, 
Pt. III, c. IV, "ProblelTil:> in Connection with Shifts in Control, Mergers, 
and Consolidatiom; of lnve:stment Companies." H . R. Doc. No. 279, 76th 
Cong., 1st Se&-.., pp. 1017-1562. 
H While the House and Senate Report;,; indicate that. the Congress' 
thief concern wa.~ protection of the public investor::; of the investment 
eompa.ny, S. Rep. No. 1175, 76th Cong., 3d Ses;,;., 14 (1940); H. R. Rep. 
No. 2639, /nth Con g., ;)ct Se:ss., 9 ( 1940), the :;tatute has been construed 
lo afford protection to the ~t.ockholdcr::; of the affiliate as well. See FiftA 
.1t•entte Cooch Lines, Inc , -n Fl E. C' 6:35, 639 (1967). 
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whether the transaction was "reasonable and fair and did not 
involve overreaching on the part of any person concerned." 12 
Given the wide variety of possible transactions between 
an investment company and its affiliates, Congress, quite 
understandably, made no attempt to define this standard with 
any greater precision. Instead, it followed the practice fre-
quently employed in other administrative schemes. The 
language of the statute was cast in broad terms and designed 
to encompass all situations falling within the scope of the 
statute; an agency with great experience in the industry was 
given the task of applying those criteria to particular business 
situations in a manner consistent with the legislative intent.13 
c 
In this case, a judgment as to whether the terms of the 
merger were "fair and reasonable" turned upon the value 
assigned to Christiana. In making such an evaluation, the 
Commission concluded that "[t]he single, readily usable tool 
of net asset value does the job much better than an accura.te 
guage of market impact .... " 5 S. E. C. Docket, at 751. 
Investment companies, it reasoned, are essentially a portfolio 
of securities whose individual prices are determined by the 
forces of the securities marketplace. In determining value in 
merger situations, "asset value" is thus much more applicable 
12 15 U. S. C. 80a-17 (b) (1). 
13 Thi::; situation is quite different from that which confronted the Court 
Parlier this Term in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries. - U.S.- (1977). 
There, the Court held that "the narrow legal issue" of implying a private 
right of action under thP sPcuritie::; laws wa::; "one peculiarly reserved for 
JUdicial re:>olution" nnd that the experience of t.he Commission on such a 
question was of ''limitPd value." - U. S. - n. 27. Moreover, the 
Commission's Chairman, in te;;timony before Congress on the relevant 
legi;;lation, had taken a pot<ition opposed to that asserted by the Com-
mission';; amicus brief in Piper. By contrast, this case does not involvo 
a purely legal dPtrrmination but, rather, an assessment as to whether a 
given bu;;ine"" a rrang<'ment. i::; compatible with the regulatory scheme 
which the agnl('y is charged hy Congress to administer. 
' . 
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to investment companies than to other corporate entities. 
The value of the securities surrendered is, basically, the real 
value received by the transferee. 
In reviewing a decision of the Commission, a court must 
consider both the facts found and the application of the 
relevant statute by the agency. Congress has mandated that, 
in review of§ 17 proceedings, "[t]he findings of the Commis-
sion as to facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be 
conclusive." 15 U. S. C. § 80a-42. A reviewing court is also 
to be guided by the "venerable principle that the construction 
of a statute by those charged with its execution should be 
followed unless there are compelling indications that it is 
wrong .... " Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 
381 (1969). "[C]ontemporaneous construction is entitled to 
great weight ... even though it was a.pplied in cases settled 
by consent rather than by litigation." F'PC v. Ma.ndel Bros., 
359 U. S. 385 (1959). Here, however, the Court of Appeals 
held, as a matter of law, that the Commission erred in the 
method applied in passing on the merger, thus all but ignoring 
the congressional limitations on judicial review of agency 
action. 
The Commission has long recognized that the key factor in 
the valuation of the assets of a closed end investment com-
pany sh01 ti I be the market price of the underlying securities. 
This metlvJd of setting the value of investment companies is, 
as CongrC'ss contemplated, the product of the agency's long 
and intimate familiarity with the investment company 
industry. For instance, in issuing an advisory report to 
the United States District Court pursuant to § 1703 of 
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, the Commission advised 
that "it is natural that net asset value based upon market 
prices should be the fundamental valuation criterion used by 
and large in the investment company field." Central States 
Electric Corporation, 30 S. E. C. 680, 700 (1949), approved, 
sub nom. Central States Electric Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F. 2d 
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879, 884 (CA4 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 917 (1951). ,, 
Similarly, in mergers like the one presented in this case, the 
Commission has used "net asset value" as a touchstone in its 
analysis. See, e. g., Delaware Realty and Investment Com-
pany, 40 S. E. C. 469, 473 (1961); Harbor Plywood Corp. and 
Hunt Foods and Industries, Inc., 40 S. E. C. 1002 (1962); 
Eastern States Corporation, Investment Company Act Re-
leases Nos. 5693 and 5711 (1969).14 
Moreover, despite the characterization of the Court of 
Appeals to the contrary, the Commission did not employ a 
mechanical application of a rule or "presumption." It con-
sidered carefully the contentions of the respondents that a 
departure from the use of net asset value was warranted in 
this case. Upon analysis, it concluded that the central and 
controlling aspect of the merger remained the fact that it 
consisted of an exchange of Du Pont common stock for 
Du Pont common stock; it was not Christiana stock but 
Du Pont stock which Du Pont was receiving in the merger. 
As to the claim that Du Pont stock would be adversely 
affected over an extended period of time by volume selling, 
the Commission concluded there was no indication of a long 
term adverse market impact. It noted that Christiana stock 
1"1 This method of valuation of closed end investment companies was 
~imilarly employed in Elt, Inc., Investment Company Act Release Nos. 
X675 and 8714, Chemical Fund, Inc., Investment Company Act Release 
No. 8773, The Citizens and Southern Capital Corp., Investment Com-
pany Act Release Nos. 7755 and 7802, Detroit and Cleveland Naviga-
twn Company, Investment Company Act Release Nos. 3082 and 3099, 
Cheapside Dollar Fund Limited, Investment Company Act Release Nos. 
7053 and 7094. The Commission has, of course, required that such.valua-
tJOns be adjusted to reflect such factors as expenses of the merger and 
tnx considerations. Tally Industries, Inc., Investment Company Act 
Hrlease No. 5953 and Electric Bond and Share Company, Investment 
Company Act Relra.se No. 5215, cited by the Court of Appeals, did not 
rely on net asset \'alue ,.;incr the companies held substantial assets other 
than securitie::;. While Chri:stiana also had some assets other than Du 
Pnnt, stock, they amounted to only 2% of its assets. 
' . 
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was held principally by long term investors. There was no 
evidence that Christiana stockholders, who for years had been 
indirect investors in Du Pont, would now change the essential 
nature of their investment. 
The Commission's reliance on "net asset value'' in this 
particular case and its consequent determination that the 
proposed merger met the statutory standards thus rested 
"squarely in that area where administrative judgments are 
entitled to the greatest amount of weight by the appellate 
courts. It is the product of administrative experience, appre-
ciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the 
statutory policies, and reasonable treatment of the uncon-
tested facts." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 209 
( 1947). In rejecting the conclusion of the Commission, the 
Court of Appeals substituted its own judgment for that of the 
agency charged by Congress with that responsibility. Indeed, 
after receiving briefs in oral argument, the Court of 
Appeals-over the objection of the Commission, Christiana 
and Du Pont--undertook the unique appellate procedure of 
employing a university professor to assist the court in under-
standing the record in this case and to prepare reports and 
memoranda for the court. Thus, the reports relied upon by 
that court included a variety of data and economic observa-
tions which had not been examined and tested by the tradi-
tional methods of the adversary process. We are not cited to 
any statute, rule, or decision authorizing the procedure 
employed by the Court of Appeals. Cf. Fed. Rule App. 
Proc. 16. 
In our view. the Court of Appeals clearly departed from its 
' tatutory appellate function and applied an erroneous stand-
ard in its review of the decision of the Corrunission. The 
record made by the parties before the Commission was in 
accord with traditional procedures and that record clearly 
revea.ls substantial evidence to support the findings of the 
Commission . Moreover, the agency conclusions of law were 
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based on a construction of the statute consistent with the 
legislative intent. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is reversed. 
Reversed. 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
\ 
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